Document Type : پژوهشی
Author
Associate Professor - Faculty of Law and Political Science, Ferdowsi University of Mashhad, Mashhad, Iran.
Abstract
This study examines the structure and evolution of criminal protection of the monetary system in Iranian law, emphasizing its gradual transformation from regulatory safeguards to security-oriented responses. Employing a doctrinal–analytical methodology, the research analyzes statutory provisions, judicial interpretations, and institutional reforms governing the monetary and financial domains, particularly under the Monetary and Banking Law of 1972, the Non-Banking Financial Market Regulation Act of 2004, the Islamic Penal Code (Book V, 2013), and the Law on the Punishment of Disruptors of the Economic System (1990, as amended until 2021).
Findings indicate a three-tiered framework of criminal protection in Iranian monetary legislation: (1) Preliminary protection, characterized by mild criminal responses such as fines or short-term imprisonment for minor monetary or foreign exchange violations, primarily aimed at behavioral correction and maintenance of transactional order; (2) Intermediate deterrent protection, focused on safeguarding the credibility of legal payment instruments through criminalization of acts such as forgery, falsification, and counterfeiting of coins, banknotes, and negotiable instruments, with penalties ranging from one to ten years; and (3) Aggravated protection, where monetary offenses escalate into security-level crimes under the Law on Economic Disruptors, encompassing large-scale or system-threatening conduct—such as major currency smuggling or organized counterfeiting—punishable by long-term imprisonment, extensive confiscation of assets, or even capital punishment in cases constituting corruption on earth (efsad fel-arz).
The paper clarifies the conceptual ambiguity of “disruption” (ekhalal) by distinguishing between its behavioral and consequential dimensions. It argues that disruption must be assessed in terms of both mens rea (criminal intent) and the systemic impact on monetary stability, calling for quantitative criteria and expert-based evaluation. Institutionally, the 2023 Central Bank Act strengthens the supervisory and preventive capacities of the monetary authority by providing for specialized judicial and disciplinary mechanisms to address financial crimes.
The study concludes that the effectiveness of Iran’s criminal monetary policy hinges upon institutional coordination, preventive oversight, and a balanced distinction between economic and security rationales. Accordingly, it recommends: (1) joint issuance of operational guidelines by the Central Bank and the Judiciary to define measurable indicators of disruption; (2) amendment of Article 526 of the Islamic Penal Code to clearly differentiate “intent to disrupt” from “profit-seeking motivation”; (3) establishment of institutional monitoring mechanisms for high-risk monetary transactions; and (4) specialization of Revolutionary Courts to ensure interpretive consistency in monetary and foreign exchange offenses. Overall, the findings demonstrate that while Iran’s legal framework for the criminal protection of the monetary system is comprehensive, it still requires conceptual clarification, procedural standardization, and institutional integration to transition from reactive punishment to preventive governance in safeguarding monetary stability and public trust.
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